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Abstract 
 In many cases poor information quality appears mainly due to in-effectiveness of information 
management including information production and delivery. Where this situation poses a certain risk.  
A holistic information risk management model has been previously proposed. But the model has some 
limitations especially on risk calculation and risk priority ranking as the model does not consider existing 
control effectiveness. In this paper, a new risk assessment method is proposed in order to improve the 
model of total impact of risks and to improve the accuracy of risk priority ranking by modifying the extended 
risk matrix approach (RMA) where we take into account the existing control effectiveness. Using our 
approach by adding a new dimension on extended RMA. We are able to improve the accuracy (7.15%) 
and reduced the ambiguity (1.34) of assessment results on real cases illustration. 
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1. Introduction 
It is widely understood that information is a strategic asset for an enterprise so that it 
has to be maintained. This fact is especially true for organization whose information production 
is their main activity [1]. Moreover. information proliferation has increased the global sales of 
business intelligence and analytics software at around 22% in 2008 [2]. But when delivery of 
data and information assets is not aligned with its objectives and intended goals then problems 
of information quality (IQ) will arise. This problem could be the source of various losses, big 
risks and even catastrophe especially when it leads to an incorrect decision making [3, 4]. 
An information system is required to ensure information quality which is valuable in 
decision making [5, 6]. In-effective information management including information production 
and delivery leads to a poor information quality and creates a negative risk impact [7]. Failure of 
obtaining expected information quality is the most influential aspect if not the main cause of 
various risks or losses [8]. In this case, risk management has an important role to protect 
information assets through systematically and holistically manage information quality [3]. One of 
important part of risk management is risk assessment process where it provides a process 
sequence. Allocates resource to mitigate risk, and issues an alarm as a warning to handle the 
risk [9, 10]. Through understanding of information quality risk assessment. Organization is 
equipped with a tool to realize the priority areas to improve information quality. 
Total Information Risk Management (TIRM) (2013) is a concept, method, technique and 
approach for risk management in information quality context. This model provides a 
systematically risk assessment framework to calculate total impact of risk for some business 
objectives such as financial, customer satisfaction, compliance and so on. This model also 
integrates many techniques in risk assessment area especially for priority ranking of information 
risks such as fault-tree analysis, bow-tie, risk matrix etc. Priority ranking using risk matrix 
approach employs two dimensions that is considered effective for decision making in risk 
management context [11]. Upon examination there seems to be some drawbacks in this model, 
since existing control effectiveness is out of consideration. The impact and likelihood are 
obtained by estimating the influence of existing control without considering its effectiveness of 
the control so that the residual impact and likelihood cannot be determined accurately. 
Furthermore, Risk matrix approach only considers two dimensions i.e. severity and frequency.  
If we take into account this existing control then there is a possibility to improve the matrix for a 
better decision making. 
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In this paper, we propose an information production risk assessment procedure by 
deriving a new calculation method for total impact in financial objectives. We employ the threat 
dependency scenario model as a building block to obtain total impact while at the same time 
consider the control effectiveness that has been implemented. In addition we propose a new 
method to increase accuracy of risks priority ranking when we take into account the 
effectiveness of existing control. We adopt the ISO 27005:2008 standard framework where risk 
assessment processes include asset, threat, control and vulnerability as risk factors. 
Considering existing control, we propose recoverability as an addition dimension to risk matrix 
approach derived in [10] to improve its function. Finally we provide a real case implementation 
of our proposed method in a government institution. In this paper, section 2 describes related 
works, section 3 describes our proposed method, and a real case illustration will be elaborated 
in section 4, and finally we conclude our study in section 5. 
 
 
2. Related Works 
As mentioned before, TIRM provides a holistic and systematic information risk 
management. This model is based on ISO 31000 standard and provides mathematical model to 
calculate total impact through frequency of a task. A probability of required information, 
frequency of information quality problem, and probability of direct and indirect impact [7]. On the 
model, examination of existing risk control is a very important step to identify whether existing 
controls already been implemented to prevent IQ problem and/or their consequences [7]. 
Without understanding what kind of control which is applied as respond to a risk, error will arise 
in risk analysis and evaluation [3]. To assess existing risk control, one has to understand how 
effective is the control that has been applied in the organization. In this context, there seems to 
be some limitation on the TIRM model. It does not include existing control effectiveness 
explicitly to calculate total impact. The model only identifies what existing control is, and it 
estimate likelihood and impact without modelling the probability of control effectiveness. As a 
consequence there is no guarantee that the result will produce exactly how effective existing 
control is, what the likelihood is, and how big the residual impact is. These facts may cause 
errors in risk analysis result. 
In other development, Risk Matrix Approach (RMA) is a technique used in risk 
assessment, especially for risk priority ranking proposed by Electronic System Centre.  
This technique has been widely used in industry [7, 11]. This approach has been integrated into 
the TIRM model at risk evaluation and ranking stage [7]. In RMA, risk matrices consists of two 
key matrix which is impact and likelihood of risk. This technique is useful for qualitatively 
identifying which risks are the most critical and has enabled industry to determine the priority for 
corrective action [10, 11]. In addition, the risk matrix is also an effective tool and widely used to 
improve risk management decisions [11]. Nevertheless, it appears that some disadvantages of 
this technique exist. The index classification is less accurate, assessment mechanisms are 
based on subjective calculation and the matrix has not always been able to meet the needs and 
complexity of risk assessment diversities [10]. Moreover this technique is not as simple as it is 
claimed to be. It takes a lot of considerations and requirements to create an ideal matrix to 
improve risk management decisions, since it is based only on aggregation or merging of two 
attributes, namely the likelihood and impact [11].  
To overcome those weakness, there has been already several attempts to improve 
applicability of risk matrix approach, such as clustering algorithm to improve risk matrix 
classification index [12]. Borda method is also developed to improve risk matrix precision, 
although this effort cannot eliminate risk ties completely [13]. There are also some proposed risk 
calculation algorithm to improve objectivity of assessment process [14]. All of these 
developments are relied on the original published risk matrix where matrix dimension is limited 
to two dimension and for many cases this limitation create inflexibility in risk assessment 
problem and requirements [10]. There are some proposed frameworks to extend the risk matrix 
approach. Extension framework of RMA techniques is proposed by [10] to address complexity 
and to meet the risk assessment requirements. The purpose of this extension is to widen its 
applicability where input variables can be selected from variety of options with different 
combinations according to requirement on actual situation [15]. Recoverability has been 
proposed as an additional dimension to address the complexity of risk assessment in supply 
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chain area, where recoverability is defined as the system's ability to achieve acceptable limits or 
levels of operation after a risk event occurs [10]. 
In the previously mentioned risk assessment mathematical model and risk matrix 
approach, the role of existing control effectiveness has not been treated or considered.  
To improve the overall accuracy of the model, in this paper we will create a formulation to 
determine residue likelihood and impact involving existing control effectiveness. We will show 
that the risk assessment result is better to represent the actual conditions. We develop further a 
new dimension namely recoverability in the context of information quality to improver the 
accuracy of the extend risk matrix approach. In final section we will show the implementation of 
our proposed method in a real government institution. 
 
 
3. Proposed Method 
In this paper, our proposed information quality risk assessment method is limited to 
information production domain which consists of four steps. We utilize the dimensions in this 
domain to assess information quality as an input for risk assessment process. Then, we define 
information system components as assets to support information quality. We develop a 
conceptual model to map the risk factors and their relation. Based on this relation we develop 
probability model in a step-by-step procedure to calculate the risk assessment. 
 
3.1. Conceptual Model 
Information production as our object of research is defined as an information creation 
phase, which is supported by information system components where this information system is 
considered as assets where each asset has threats, vulnerabilities and controls. The existing 
control identification in this proposed model will adopt the types of control described in [16] i.e. 
preventive, dissuasive, protective, palliative and recuperative. Our construction of conceptual 
model is based on the following principles. 
 The controls in use have different types, where depend on these control types one can 
determine the effectiveness of control to reduce likelihood and impact; 
 Control is applied to a threat that exploit vulnerabilities or several vulnerabilities in  
relevant assets; 
 Threats can exploit more than one vulnerabilities; 
 A threat that successfully exploits vulnerabilities could affect more than one technical impact; 
 Reductions of information quality characteristics affect the financial impact. 
Based on the above principles, we create a conceptual model illustrated in Figure 1, 
where in general we adopt the model proposed in [16]. Conceptual model as in Figure 1 
described components of the model and relationships between them. The components consists 
of controls, threats, vulnerabilities and both of technical and financial impact. The list of assets 
used in this study is described in Table 1 where we adopted [17]. Each asset can be seen in our 
unified conceptual model.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Proposed conceptual model 
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Table 1. List of Assets 
Code Asset 
A1 Data and information 
A2 Software 
A3 Hardware 
A4 Network 
A5 Auxiliary equipment 
A6 Physical infrastructure 
A7 Personnel 
 
 
Notes 
Asset n : Asset – n 
IQD n : Information quality dimension – n 
Vn : Vulnerability – n 
Tn : Threat – n 
Cn : Control – n 
DISS : Control combination effectiveness for Dissuasive 
PREV : Control combination effectiveness for Preventive 
PROT : Control combination effectiveness for Protective 
PALL : Control combination effectiveness for Palliative 
RECU : Control combination effectiveness for Recuperative 
LR(Tn) : Control combination effectiveness for likelihood reduction 
IR(Tn) : Control combination effectiveness for impact reduction 
 
3.2. Probability Model 
The detail of construction of the above conceptual model can be described step by step 
as follows: 
Step 1: Determining scope of assessment.  
In this step, we define assessment scope of business process. This scope can be 
defined as primary or supporting business process or based on business process criticality. 
Then we determine the business objective such as financial, operational efficiency, strategy, 
customer satisfaction etc. In this paper, we focus only on financial aspect of business objective. 
Step 2: Performing information quality assessment.  
Information quality assessment is conducted to get ideal (target) and existing quality.  
In this step we refer to the information process flow described in [18. 19] as illustrated in  
Figure 2. Information process consists of two phases called information production phase 
(source, transfer and process) and information delivery phase (access and use). Each process 
(source, transfer and so on) has different dimension as its information quality parameters. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Information process flow [18, 19] 
 
 
To determine IQ dimension standard, we create IQ dimension–attribute catalogue.  
This catalogue describes what attributes will be used in IQ assessment. In this paper we will 
focus only on information production phase risk assessment. Therefore, we will use IQ 
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dimensions related to source, transfer and process (information production phase). There are 
eight dimensions for source and process, and one dimension for transfer [8]. Although, 
transferability dimension is rarely mentioned in literatures, we still assume that this characteristic 
is important. Transferability is distribution value from one process to another process and a part 
of information network (communication infrastructure and access to data and information) [8]. 
To develop IQ dimension-attribute catalogue, we refer to [20] for the summary of dimension and 
attribute comparison between many types of published literatures. Based on analysis on the 
summary, our IQ dimension–attribute catalogue can be seen in Table 2. Each dimension has its 
own attributes which explains qualitative parameter for information quality. 
 
 
Table 2. IQ Dimension-Attribute Catalogue 
Dimension Attribute Code Description 
Accuracy 
Correct AC1 
The degree of correctness form of information 
presentation to the user 
Free of error AC2 Free of error during information production process 
Objectivity Unbiased OB1 
The data was obtained not because of assumptions or 
conjectures 
Reliability From good source RE1 The data was obtained from correct source 
Transferability 
Free of network failure TR1 Free of network failure during transfer process 
Sending media are good TR2 Used media is effective and efficient 
Content 
Data are clear without 
ambiguity 
CONT1 The data presented is clear and does not cause ambiguity 
Consistency 
Compatible with previous 
data 
CONS1 
In accordance with the data obtained. processed or stored 
before 
Presented in the same 
format 
CONS2 Data elements are presented in the same format 
Completeness 
Complete COM1 No missing data elements 
Include all necessary value COM2 Includes all important information elements 
Timeliness 
Up to date TI1 The degree of response to update 
Delivered on timely TI2 The degree of all elements can be delivered on time 
Security 
Restricted appropriately SE1 Information restrictions appropriately 
Secure SE2 
Security is maintained throughout the information 
production process 
 
 
Input for this step is the scope or detail description of business process from the 
previous step. The detail of business process should be mapped to IP-MAP model [21].  
From this model we get information and description on how the process of information 
production is performed. Through description from this model, we can understand what activity 
that is mapped to information production process (source, transfer, process) and what is the 
quality dimension requirement of each activity. In practice, we create questionnaire instrument 
based on the attribute of each dimension from the catalogue and relation to each activity.  
This instrument is used as a reference for IQ assessment process. 
Step 3: Identify and estimate risk factor and risk profile.  
In this step, risk factor identification is based on the catalogue of ISO/IEC 27005:2008. 
ISO 27001:2005 and a brief description in [16]. A risk is the probability of losses caused by 
threats, vulnerabilities and impacts [22]. Therefore, a risk is accumulation of probabilities 
associated with the risk itself. In this study, probabilities are calculated using subjective 
probabilities based on the knowledge and experience of the personnel involved in a process or 
system or experts. In Bayesian conditional probability, a prior opportunity represents a trust 
distribution reflecting the amount of initial trust of agents contributing to the hypothesis of an 
event [23]. In general, to calculate this probability value we refer to GB/T 20984-2007 [14, 24]. 
The detail of calculation of probability of risk factor and risk profile can be derived in the 
following steps. 
1) Risk factor identification and estimation 
a) Asset 
Asset is defined as everything that has value to the organization and needs protection. 
In our conceptual model asset is expressed as variable Asset and Asset valuation can be 
divided in two variables: criticality and asset cost [25]. In our case, asset criticality is expressed 
on a qualitative scale following the standard given in [24]. The identification result of this asset 
which produce asset criticality level is expressed in the scale of 1 to 5. 
TELKOMNIKA  ISSN: 1693-6930  
 
Risk assessment of information production using extended risk matrix... (Jaka Sembiring) 
1329 
b) Threat 
On the conceptual model, a threat is denoted as variable Tn. A threat has the potential 
to harm assets such as information, processes, systems and even organizations. Threats can 
take the form of a natural or human origin and could be due to a deliberate or unintentional. 
According to [26], a vulnerability does not cause a risk if there are no threat to be exploited. 
Therefore, in our paper, we assume that a threat has dependent relationships with 
vulnerabilities. If the probability of vulnerability is increasing than it will be easier for threats to 
exploit. The probability of vulnerability indicates the degree of influence of vulnerability to the 
possible threat. Therefore, threat is a conditional probability of vulnerability. A threat occurs 
given vulnerabilities occurs. We use subjective Bayesian probability and expert perception as a 
prior probability. All of the above phenomena are described mathematically in the following: 
 
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡) =
𝑃(𝑉𝑛𝑡|𝑇𝑛𝑡)𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡)
∑ 𝑃(𝑉𝑛𝑡|𝑇𝑛𝑡)𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡)
𝑁𝑇
𝑛𝑡=1
 (1) 
 
𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑛𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡) × (1 − 𝑃(𝐿𝑅𝑛𝑡)) (2) 
 
𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡) × (1 − 𝑃(𝐼𝑅𝑛𝑡)) (3) 
 
where: 
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡) : Probability of threats based on information from the probability of 
vulnerability (posterior). 
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡) : Probability of threat based on subject expert judgment (prior). 
𝑃(𝑉𝑛𝑡|𝑇𝑛𝑡) : Probability that states the degree of vulnerability influence to threats. 
𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑛𝑡) : Probability of residue threat likelihood. 
𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑡) : Probability of residue threat impact. 
after we obtain the threat probability, we could map the result to threat classification, where the 
qualitative classification consist of five level as in [24]. This quantitative classification is used to 
make it easier for classification process of threat probability. 
c) Existing Control 
Control as a way to lessen risk is divided into two types: (i) control that serves to reduce 
likelihood and (ii) control that serves to reduce impact. According to [16], likelihood reducers are 
dissuasive and preventive type of controls and the impact reducers are protective, palliative and 
recuperative types of control. Parameter α and β are the weight of each type of control. Weight 
ratio using α1:α2=1:2 and β1:β2:β3=1:2:2 [16]. The parameter  𝑃(𝐿𝑅𝑛𝑡) is the effectiveness 
probability of likelihood reducer and 𝑃(𝐼𝑅𝑛𝑡) is the effectiveness of impact reducer control. 
 
𝑃(𝐿𝑅𝑛𝑡) =
𝛼1×𝑃(𝐷𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑛𝑡)+𝛼2×𝑃(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑛𝑡)
𝛼1+𝛼2
 (4) 
 
𝑃(𝐼𝑅𝑛𝑡) =
𝛽1×𝑃(𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝑛𝑡)+𝛽2×𝑃(𝑃𝐴𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑡)+𝛽3×𝑃(𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑈𝑛𝑡)
𝛽1+𝛽2+𝛽3
 (5) 
 
where: 
𝑃(𝐿𝑅𝑛𝑡) : Probability of likelihood reducer control effectiveness. 
𝑃(𝐼𝑅𝑛𝑡) : Probability of impact reducer control effectiveness. 
d) Vulnerability 
According to [26], incorrect or malfunctioning controls could become a vulnerability. 
Therefore, in this paper, the probability of vulnerability is calculated based on the value of the  
in-effective control of the associated vulnerability. One particular threat can exploit more than 
one vulnerability, while control is explicitly dedicated to overcoming such threat. So that the 
probability of vulnerability is calculated based on in-effective control of the threats that exploit 
relevant vulnerability. Therefore, eventhough parameter 𝑉𝑛𝑡 consists of 𝑉1𝑛𝑡 . … . 𝑉𝑛𝑣𝑛𝑡, it has only 
one probability value to represent the value of vulnerabilities in one relevant threat. We assume 
that in-effective probability of likelihood reduction does not affect each other (independent), and 
they are also independent to the in-effective probability of impact reduction, so that it is possible 
to use multiplication operation in (6). 
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𝑃(𝑉𝑛𝑡) = (1 − 𝑃(𝐿𝑅𝑛𝑡)) × (1 − 𝑃(𝐼𝑅𝑛𝑡)) (6) 
 
This vulnerability probability value is then mapped to vulnerability classification.  
We adopt the qualitative classification level in [24], which consist of five level. This quantitative 
classification is used to make classification process of vulnerability probability easier. 
2) Probability of threat risk calculation 
To calculate each likelihood and impact of each threat, we refer to [14]. Likelihood of 
threat risk (𝑓1) is a function of threat and vulnerability, while impact of threat risk (𝑓2) is a 
function of asset and vulnerability [14]. To calculate (𝑓1), we are using formula and weight 
(notation 𝛼 and 𝛽) from [14] as in (7). Using (7), the result of threat risk likelihood calculation 
using two matrix dimensions can be seen in Table 3. The probability of likelihood is the result of 
𝑓1 divided by the maximum value of 𝑓1 (25) where for threat level 5 the parameter 𝛼 is 3, and for 
vulnerability level 5 then the parameter 𝛽 is 2. 
 
𝑓1 = 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛽𝑣 (7) 
 
 
Table 3. Calculation of Threat Risk Likelihood Based on Two Matrix Dimension [14] 
𝑓1 
V 
1 2 3 4 5 
T 
1 3 4 5 10 12 
2 5 6 7 12 14 
3 7 8 9 14 16 
4 13 14 15 20 22 
5 16 17 18 23 25 
 
 
for function (𝑓2), we perform some modification, since according to research result  
in [26]. vulnerability exploitation by threat could pose a risk. If there is no threat related to a 
certain vulnerability, then there would be no risk appear. Therefore, an impact is a function of 
threat, vulnerability and asset criticality. We assumed that threat and vulnerability have a 
mutually exclusive relationship as well as independent relationship between asset-threat and 
vulnerability, so that 
 
𝑓2 = (𝛼𝑡 + 𝜑𝑣) × 𝛾𝑎 (8) 
 
The parameter α, φ and 𝛾 are the weight of each variable (𝑡 for threat level, 𝑣 for 
vulnerability level and 𝑎 for asset criticality level). In this study, we adopt the weight value  
from [14]. Based on our modification, we develop a new matrix of three dimensions for impact 
as shown in Table 4 which shows the matrix calculation result using formula (8). For illustration, 
using the weight as used in [14], the estimation result will be (i) when the threat level is 4 then 
parameter 𝛼 is 3, (ii) when the vulnerability level is 2 then parameter 𝜑 is 2, and (iii) when the 
asset level is 5 then parameter 𝛾 is 2.5. Based on the estimate above and (8), 𝑓2 is 200.  
The probability of impact will be the result of 𝑓2 divided by the maximum value of 𝑓2 (375) where 
the threat level is 5 for parameter 𝛼=3, the vulnerability level is 5 for 𝜑=3, and the asset level  
is 5 for 𝛾=2.5. 
Following the description in [10], recoverability is defined as the system's ability to 
achieve acceptable limits or levels of operation after a risk event occurred. Therefore, to 
calculate recoverability, we assumed that recoverability is defined as the percentages 
(probability) of reduced threat (both of reduced likelihood threat and reduced impact threat) after 
controls are implemented. This probability value represents the organization’s ability to reduce a 
certain threat. The parameter 𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐿𝑛𝑡) is defined as recoverability related to the threat 
likelihood as in (9) and 𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡) defined as recoverability related to the threat impact  
as in (10). 
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Table 4. Calculation of Threat Risk Impact Based on Three Matrix Dimension 
𝑓2 
A 
T V 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 
1 4 8 30 40 50 
2 6 12 45 60 75 
3 11 22 82.5 110 137.5 
4 14 28 105 140 175 
5 17 34 127.5 170 212.5 
2 
1 6 12 45 60 75 
2 8 16 60 80 100 
3 13 26 97.5 130 162.5 
4 16 32 120 160 200 
5 19 38 142.5 190 237.5 
3 
1 8 16 60 80 100 
2 10 20 75 100 125 
3 15 30 112.5 150 187.5 
4 18 36 135 180 225 
5 21 42 157.5 210 262.5 
4 
1 14 28 105 140 175 
2 16 32 120 160 200 
3 21 42 157.5 210 262.5 
4 24 48 180 240 300 
5 27 54 202.5 270 337.5 
5 
1 17 34 127.5 170 212.5 
2 19 38 142.5 190 237.5 
3 24 48 180 240 300 
4 27 54 202.5 270 337.5 
5 30 60 225 300 375 
 
 
𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐿𝑛𝑡) =  
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡)−𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑛𝑡)
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡)
 (9) 
 
𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡) =
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡)−𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑡)
𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡)
 (10) 
 
3) Probability of asset risk calculation 
After probability value of each risk dimension (likelihood, impact and recoverability) for 
each threat is obtained, we can calculate the probability of each risk dimension related to certain 
asset. The likelihood and impact probability of an asset are joint probabilities of the threat risk 
relevant to the asset. For probability value of recoverability, we use the mean value probability 
of recoverability of each asset. We assumed that the threats on the same asset is mutually 
exclusive and independent. It means, threats in an asset may occur at the same time but the 
probability of those threat is independent each other. 
 
𝑃(⋃ 𝐴𝑘
𝑁
𝑘=1 ) = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴𝑘) − ∑ 𝑃(𝐴𝑘 ∩ 𝐴𝑗)+. . +(−1)
𝑁+1𝑁
𝑗=𝑘 𝑃(𝐴1 ∩. .∩ 𝐴𝑁)
𝑁
𝑘=1  (11) 
 
notes 
𝑃(𝐴𝑘) : Probability of likelihood/impact threat risk. 
𝑃 (𝐴𝑘 ∩ 𝐴𝑗) : Joint probability of likelihood/ impact/recoverability one threat risk to each 
other. Since threats in an asset are independent, then joint probability is 
calculated as 𝑃(𝐴𝑘) × 𝑃(𝐴𝑗). 
 
Step 4: Calculating risk priority rank and calculating total impact.  
1) Risk ranking estimation 
Each dimension probability will be mapped to dimension classification of risk to 
represent risk matrix. The classification of each dimension is shown in Table 5, where we follow 
the classification described in [14]. The impact classification is created using the data in Table 4 
and using k-means method [12] for classification. We can see that our proposed classification 
method can eliminate the subjectivity of classification by human decision maker. Meanwhile, 
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the recoverability classification is calculated based on organization perception since it will be 
different from one organization to the other depends on their capability. 
 
 
Table 5. Classification of Risk Matrix Dimension 
Numeric 
Likelihood Impact 
Range Range 
1 0.01% 20.00% 0.01% 16.00% 
2 20.01% 44.00% 16.01% 34.67% 
3 44.01% 64.00% 34.68% 50.67% 
4 64.01% 84.00% 50.68% 72.00% 
5 84.01% 100.00% 72.01% 100.00% 
 
 
In this paper, risk priority ranking is developed using extended risk matrix approach and 
Borda rank method. This method is more accurate than simple method of multiplying each level 
of risk matrix dimension as in [15]. Since the matrix dimension is extended by adding new 
dimension (recoverability). Borda rank method calculate four dimensions (likelihood, impact, 
likelihood recoverability and impact recoverability). In this paper, the objective of risks priority 
ranking is to inform the decision makers on the priority of risk and the list of assets who has the 
highest risk until lowest risk by considering the level of likelihood, impact, and recoverability. 
The highest rank means the asset has a highest level of likelihood and impact, but the lowest 
level of recoverability. 
 
𝑏𝑖 =  ∑ (𝑁 −  𝑅𝑖𝑘)
𝑚
𝑘=1  (12) 
 
where 
N : Number of risk (asset). 
k : Criteria of evaluation (L. I. RecL. RecI). 
m : Number of k (m = 4). 
Rik : Number risk which has greater than risk i on k criteria evaluation. 
bi : Index of Borda for risk 
2) Calculating total impact 
In this paper, the calculation of total impact is limited to financial impact only.  
This impact is based on a technical impact for each dimension of information quality.  
We calculate the financial impact of each asset through gap percentages between ideal and 
actual information quality after risk occurs, then multiply the number by asset cost. 
 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑎 =  ∑ (𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑖) × 𝐼𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑑)
𝑁𝐼
𝑛𝑖=1 ×
1
𝑁𝐼
 (13) 
 
𝐹𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑎 =  
(𝐼𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑑−(𝐼𝑄𝐷𝑛𝑑−𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑎))
𝐼𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑑
× 𝐴𝐶 (14) 
 
where 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑎 : Technical impact of dimension. 
𝑃(𝐼𝑛𝑖) : Probability of risk impact. 
𝐼𝑄𝐼𝑛𝑑 : Ideal value of IQ. 
NI : Number of dimension that receive the impact. 
𝐹𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑎 : Financial impact of dimension. 
𝐼𝑄𝐴𝑛𝑑 : Actual value of IQ. 
AC : Asset cost. 
 
 
4. Real Case Illustration and Discussion 
In this chapter, we will present a real case illustration of our proposed method in a 
government institution in Indonesia. Due to the nature of organization, we could not expose the 
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name of the organization. We emphasize on their administration business process for the scope 
of implementation. We define and detail this scope into IP-MAP and identify each activity into 
information production phase (source, transfer and process). The summary of research results 
in [19] states that the dimensions which are important in government context are accuracy, 
transferability, completeness and security. Using IQ dimension–attribute catalogue in Table 2, 
we create several questionnaire instruments to find the existing and target of information quality. 
The result of this IQ assessment is shown in Table 6, where we can see that the lowest existing 
quality is in completeness dimension. 
 
 
Table 6. Summary of Information Quality 
Dimension AC TR COM TI SE 
Target 5.083 5.611 5.75 5.33 5.67 
Existing 4.167 4.67 4.33 4.9167 4.89 
 
 
To simplify the elaboration of the process, we will concentrate only on personnel  
asset (A7), the other assets will follow the same procedure. Based on identification step, there 
are 3 threats in asset A7, and we described this situation as in Figure 3 and Table 7 where 
implemented controls were related to maintain asset A7. To estimate the probability of risk 
factors (threats, control and vulnerabilities), we employ s (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), and (6), and to 
estimate the probability of risk profile of A7 (likelihood, impact, recoverability of likelihood and 
recoverability of impact) we use s (7), (8), (9) and (10), where the results can be seen in  
Table 8. To calculate probability of asset risk, we use (11) as joint probability of threats in an 
asset and the result is also shown in in Table 9 as a risk profile for asset A7. This procedure can 
be repeated for other assets, until finally we can find the complete risk profile of our case 
illustration institution as in Table 10. Our calculation result shows that first priority is in asset A2 
which means that asset A2 has high likelihood, high impact but low recoverability. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Implementation model 
 
 
Table 7. Risk Factors Detail of A7 
Asset criticality 5 
Asset cost IDR 162000 (this asset cost is only for simulation) 
Threats Controls 
Code Description Code Description 
N6 Storm C6 Personal Liability Insurance 
HA4 Organization deficiency 
C4 Determining the responsibility of termination and bonding managers 
C1 Determining role and responsibility of information quality 
C3 Organization structure and job description 
HA19 Lack of staff 
C2 Personnel recruitment 
C5 Personnel rotation 
 
VN6
VHA4
N6
HA4
RN6
C6
LR (N6) ( )
RECU IR (N6)I  ( )
RHA4C1
C4
PREV
PROT
LR (HA4) ( )
IR (HA4)I  ( )
C3
Asset – A7
Technical Impact
AC
TR
COM
TII
Financial 
Impact
i i l 
I
SE
VHA4
HA4
RHA4C2
C5
PREV
PROT
LR (HA4) ( )
IR (HA4)I  ( )
Asset – A1
.
.
.
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Table 8. Threats-controls Estimation of A7 
Threats 
Code 
Controls 
Vulnerability 
Threat 
Code Type 
Effective
ness 
Likeliho
od 
reducer 
Impa
ct 
reduc
er 
Unreduced 
Threat 
Reduced 
likelihood of 
threat 
Reduced 
impact of 
threat 
𝑃(𝐿𝑅𝑛𝑡) 𝑃(𝐼𝑅𝑛𝑡) 𝑃(𝑉𝑛𝑡) L 𝑃(𝑇𝑛𝑡|𝑉𝑛𝑡) L 𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐿𝑛𝑡) L 𝑃(𝑅𝑇𝐼𝑛𝑡) 
L 
N6 C6 
REC
U 
62.30% 
0.00% 
24.92
% 
75.08
% 
4 
20.08
% 
2 20.08% 2 15.08% 2 
HA4 
C4 
PRO
T 
62.30% 
41.53% 
12.46
% 
51.18
% 
3 
52.65
% 
4 30.78% 3 46.09% 3 C1 
PRE
V 
62.30% 
C3 
PRE
V 
HA19 
C2 
PRE
V 
62.30% 
41.53% 
9.30
% 
53.03
% 
3 
27.27
% 
3 15.95% 2 24.74% 2 
C5 
PRO
T 
46.50% 
 
 
Table 9. Summary of A7 Risk Profile 
Code 𝑓1/25 𝑓2/375 
Recoverability 
𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐿𝑛𝑡) 𝑃(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝐼𝑛𝑡) 
N6 32.00% 40.00% 0.00% 24.92% 
HA4 36.00% 40.00% 41.53% 12.46% 
HA19 28.00% 33.33% 41.53% 9.30% 
 
 
Table 10. Summary of Overall Assets Risk Profile 
Asset Code 
Likelihood Impact 
Recoverability 
B L Likelihood Impact 
P L P L P L P L 
A1 87.58% 5 93.53% 5 34.22% 4 20.20% 4 24 3 
A2 85.73% 5 90.95% 5 42.87% 4 15.64% 5 27 1 
A3 77.05% 4 82.10% 5 48.41% 4 22.23% 4 21 4 
A4 78.43% 4 83.08% 5 53.40% 3 17.77% 5 19 6 
A5 54.52% 3 51.96% 4 32.86% 4 25.04% 4 13 7 
A6 86.32% 5 87.95% 5 16.30% 5 20.08% 4 25 2 
A7 68.67% 4 76.00% 4 27.69% 4 15.56% 5 19 5 
 
 
We calculate each technical and financial impact of the threat using s (13) and (14) as 
shown in Table 11. From the table, we see that the difference between the existing condition 
after risk occurred and the target quality is 46%. It means the organization will be able to 
recover additional budget about IDR 73.762 (1:1000). The result provides us a way to analyze 
what dimensions are affected by a certain threat. For example, occurrence of threat N6 could 
affect staff’s absence. In this case other staffs should cover his/her tasks and responsibilities, 
and it may cause accumulation of task. As a result, the tasks could not be delivered in timely 
manner. In our case illustration, all of threat in personnel asset unintentionally only affect 
timeliness dimension. For other assets the case might be different.  
To evaluate the accuracy of risk priority ranking, we use mean absolute error through 
comparing actual rank with prediction rank for both cases without and with recoverability as 
illustrated in Table 12. As shown on the table, total error of risk rank without recoverability is 
higher than the one with recoverability. It means that the prediction with recoverability produces 
less error and increase the accuracy of risk rank. For the case where we add a new dimension, 
where we consider not only likelihood and impact but also recoverability, we implement Borda 
method. With this addition to the dimension, we can show that the Borda value is more diverse 
and decreasing the ambiguity of the priority risk ranking. 
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Table 11. Total Impact of A7 
Code 𝑓2/375 Ideal quality 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑑𝑛𝑎 
(Timeliness) 
N6 40.00% 
5.33 
2.13 
HA4 40.00% 2.13 
HA19 33.33% 1.78 
Average 2.01 
Actual after risk (4.9167–2.01) 2.90 
Gap after risk (5.33–2.90) 46% 
Financial impact of timeliness IDR   73.762 
 
 
Table 12. Summary of Comparing Risk Rank 
Asset 
Code 
Actual 
Without 
recoverability 
With recoverability 
R L I B R L I RecL RecI B R 
A1 2 5 5 14 2 5 5 4 4 24 3 
A2 1 5 5 14 1 5 5 4 5 27 1 
A3 4 5 5 14 5 4 5 4 4 21 4 
A4 6 5 5 14 4 4 5 3 5 19 6 
A5 7 4 4 3 7 3 4 4 4 13 7 
A6 3 5 5 14 3 5 5 5 4 25 2 
A7 5 4 5 9 6 4 4 4 5 19 5 
Total error 4 2 
 
 
From simulation results, we can show that there are at least two benefits from our 
proposed method. First, the organization will be equipped with asset priority from the risk 
ranking where this ranking is created by considering not only the magnitude and level of risk 
likelihood and impact, but also the likelihood recoverability and impact recoverability as shown 
in Table 12. Second, the organization is provided with information on how much it would cost 
when the risk occurs. In our case illustration, we provide real data of organization, and calculate 
the financial impact of timeliness as presented in Table 11 amounted IDR 73.762. Using this 
value and the result of asset priority ranking with Borda method in Table 10, we can obtain  
two-dimensional quadrant relation of the seven assets as illustrated in Figure 4. Assets belong 
to the quadrant I should receive close attention and mitigation since this asset have a high cost 
and a high-risk rank. Meanwhile assets risk in quadrant IV could be accepted or in the last  
priority to mitigate. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Two-dimensional quadrant relation of 7 assets 
 
 
To compare the result of risk assessment, we evaluate it using mean absolute error and 
risk ties density shown in (15) and (16) below. We use mean absolute error in (15) to evaluate 
risk rank accuracy, whereas risk ties density in (16) is used to compare ambiguity of risk 
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assessment result. In several cases, assessment result provide more than of one certain 
element (in our paper is IT assets) could occur in the same rank. It might make decision maker 
confused. With extended risk matrix approach instead of using only the likelihood and impact, 
by adding recoverability dimension the assessment result will be more complete and provide 
more consideration than only likelihood and impact. As the result of evaluation using mean 
absolute error and risk ties density, measured risk rank accuracy both of with and without 
recoverability dimension was 92.86% and 85.71%. Meanwhile measured risk ties density both 
of with and without recoverability dimension was 1.67 and 0.33. 
 
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 = 1 − (
1
𝑛
× ∑ |𝑓𝑖 − 𝑦𝑖|
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) × 100% (15) 
 
𝑑𝑡 =  
∑ 𝑇𝑗
𝐿
𝑗=1
𝐿
  (16) 
 
Where, 
n  : total of data  
𝑓𝑖 : rank prediction of the system 
𝑦𝑖 : rank prediction of the previous system 
𝑑𝑡  : risk ties density  
𝑇𝑗  : number of risk ties in level j 
L  : total risk level 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper proposed a new method to calculate the information quality risk assessment 
using extended risk matrix approach based on threat scenario dependency model. We include 
existing control effectiveness and IQ assessment result to calculate total impact. Through real 
implementation in a government institution, we have shown that the total impact reflects real 
condition more natural than the previously announced method. By considering existing control 
effectiveness in the calculation, we propose a new dimension of risk matrix called recoverability. 
In our real case illustration, by comparing actual ranking and prediction ranking using we can 
conclude that with our proposed method the accuracy is increasing and the risk ties on risk 
ranking is decreasing. It means that we can provide the organization with more accurate asset 
risk priority ranking where this ranking is created by considering not only the magnitude and 
level of risk likelihood and impact, but also the likelihood recoverability and impact 
recoverability. Moreover, we have shown that using out proposed method we provide the 
organization with information on how much it would cost when the risk occurs using simple but 
informative quadrant systems. 
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